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Abstract
Casual observation suggests that people are more generous with their
time than with their money. In this paper we present experimental ev-
idence supporting the hypothesis. A third of our subjects demand no
compensation for non–monetary investments, whereas almost all sub-
jects demand compensation for equally costly monetary investments.
The ﬁnding supports the contention that generosity to some extent is
symbolic and context dependent, and that social norms encourage gen-
erosity in the time domain.
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11I n troduction
Except for donations to charities and other gifts from the relatively rich to
the relatively poor, generosity is largely expressed by non–monetary means.
People often help their neighbors and friends, but rarely give them money.
Within organizations, some workers regularly sacriﬁce large amounts of time
for the beneﬁt of their colleagues, but would not even consider giving them
cash.1
Economists have proposed at least three sets of explanations for non–
monetary generosity. First, it may simply be more eﬃcient to give time than
to give money.2 Second, time gifts may constitute better signals of altruism
than money does (Camerer,1988, Prendergast and Stole, 2001, Ellingsen and
Johannesson, 2004b). Third, the donor is paternalistic and fears that a cash
gift will be spent inappropriately (Pollak, 1988). While we believe that there
is something to all of these explanations, our own sense is that powerful so-
cial norms mandate greater generosity in the time domain than in the money
domain, and that these norms are at best indirectly linked to the economists’
explanations. We are supposed to share our time more willingly than our cash,
much as social norms make us vote and give blood.3
It is hard to think of any ﬁeld evidence which might admit a clean and
direct test of our hypothesis. In most cases it is diﬃcult to measure both
the costs and the beneﬁts of time. Maybe the apparent generosity in the time
domain stems from a very high beneﬁt/cost ratio? For example, helping friends
or neighbors could be done for fun. Also, one observed favor could be part
of a reciprocal exchange over a longer time period, possibly involving other
individuals.
Since ﬁeld evidence is so hard to interpret, we have chosen instead to con-
duct a laboratory experiment. The experiment is designed to eliminate all
factors that otherwise distort the comparison between monetary and non–
monetary generosity. Roughly, the experiment runs as follows. A seller can
make an investment that yields a potential monetary gain from trade with
a buyer. Some sellers can make a monetary investment, others invest time.
1A related phenomenon, which we shall not discuss further here, is the non–monetary
nature of holiday and birthday gifts. See for example Waldfogel (1993), Prendergast and
Stole (2001), and the references therein.
2The main problem with this theory is that it does not explain why the recipient keeps
the whole eﬃciency gain; why does the recipient not pay? See Prendergast and Stole, 1999,
for a possible resolution and further references.
3The notion that peoples’ behavior is “domain-speciﬁc” is quite common in other social
sciences. See for example Waltzer (1983) and Tetlock et al. (2000). For a sociological
discussion of the meaning of money along similar lines, see Zelitzer (1994).
2Upon investment, the seller makes a bargaining proposal. The buyer, whose
gain from trade is known, either accepts or rejects the seller’s proposal. The
primary question is whether the seller’s proposal is more generous under time
investment than under monetary investment. If sellers make more generous
proposals in the non–monetary treatment, and if the change in oﬀers are not
driven by a change in buyer behavior, it is diﬃcult to interpret the change as
anything but diﬀerential generosity in the two domains.
For the comparison to be valid, costs and beneﬁts must be as similar as
possible across the two treatments. Since the opportunity cost of a sellers’
time is not observed by the buyer, the opportunity cost of monetary invest-
ments should also not be observed by buyers – preferably, the two investment
cost distributions should be identical. To achieve comparability, we elicit a
distribution of time costs from a separate group of subjects, with the same
characteristics. In the monetary treatment, both sellers and buyers know that
the investment costs are drawn from the elicited distribution, but only sellers
learn the realization. Using the elicited distribution of investment costs, it is
straightforward to keep the two treatments comparable. In the non-monetary
treatment, the investment is to perform a task for 20 minutes. In the monetary
treatment, the monetary investment cost is drawn from an elicited distribution
of time costs. The seller’s investment always generates a potential gain from
trade of SEK 100.
If agents are selﬁsh, theory predicts that sellers should always invest and
propose a price of SEK 99 (as long as the investment cost is below SEK 100).
However, a large body of work in experimental economics suggests that a sub-
stantial fraction of individuals have strong preferences for fairness in bargaining
situations, and that sellers often propose an equal split (see Camerer (2003)
and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for overviews). It has also been shown that,
with monetary investment costs, subjects often propose an equal split of the
net surplus. That is, they split evenly the surplus remaining after compen-
sating sellers for the sunk investment cost (Ellingsen and Johannesson 2004a,
2005a).4 With a non-zero investment cost even sellers that care strongly about
fairness are therefore predicted to propose a price above SEK 50.
All the models referred to above as well as the various recent models of so-
cial preferences and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002) predict that behavior should
be independent of whether the seller invests time or money. Contrary to this
4Ellingsen and Johannesson 2005b conducted a similar study with a non-monetary in-
vestment cost. However, the monetary equivalent of the investment cost was elicited without
giving incentives for truthful reporting, and the paper did not consider a comparison between
monetary and non–monetary investments.
3prediction, but in support of our hypothesis, we ﬁnd that behavior diﬀers
markedly between the two experimental treatments. In the monetary treat-
ment almost all sellers claim more than half the gross gain from trade. In
the non–monetary treatment, about a third of the sellers divide the gross gain
from trade equally, despite having incurred a positive investment cost.
2 Experiment
Our subjects were recently enrolled undergraduate business and economics stu-
dents at the Stockholm School of Economics. They were paid a participation
fee of SEK 100, and they could earn between SEK 0 and SEK 100 in the exper-
iment (SEK is Swedish Kronor; SEK 10 was approximately USD 1 at the time
of the experiment). A total of 276 subjects participated in the experiment (i.e.
138 bargaining pairs). Five sessions were carried out with between 26 and 29
bargaining pairs in each session (one session with Treatment I and two sessions
each with Treatment II and Treatment III). Each subject participated in one
treatment only. The three experimental treatments, referred to as the “con-
trol group”, the “time investment group”, and the “money investment group”
in the text, are described in more detail below. The full instructions can be
downloaded from www.hhs.se/personal/ellingsen.
An important problem in experimental work is that the framing of the
experiment matters. If the frame strongly suggests that the experiment is
concerned with gift giving, that by itself can trigger gift giving behavior. Since
we wanted to focus on generous behavior in situations where generosity is not
obviously called for, we framed the experiment as a bargaining problem.
In the experiment two individuals, form a pair. In our instructions, the
individuals are referred to neutrally as individuals A and B, but for convenience
we shall here call them respectively sellers and buyers. Sellers and buyers are
located in diﬀerent rooms, room A and room B, and pairing is anonymous
and random.5 The seller ﬁrst decides whether to carry out an investment or
not. If the investment is carried out a SEK 100 potential gain from trade is
created for the pair, and the seller and the buyer bargain over how to divide
the SEK 100 between them in an ultimatum game . The seller proposes a
price and the buyer accepts or rejects this price. If the price is accepted the
SEK 100 is divided according to the proposal, and if the price is rejected
both get nothing. To compare monetary and non–monetary investment costs,
5According to both our theory and the experiments by Andreoni and Petrie (2004)
anonymity will entail reduced generosity, but it should not aﬀect the comparison between
time and money donations.
4we implement three experimental treatments that vary with respect to the
investment cost. In the ﬁrst (“control”) treatment the investment cost is zero,
which imply that subjects essentially play the standard ultimatum game. In
the second (“time”) treatment the investment is for the seller to stay for 20
minutes after the end of the experiment. The subjects are told that investing
sellers will be given questionnaires to complete during these 20 minutes. The
investment cost in the third (“monetary”) treatment consists of a monetary
cost that is equivalent to the cost of staying 20 minutes after the end of the
experiment to complete questionnaires. Because the time cost of 20 minutes
will vary between sellers, and the cost is private information to the seller, we
separately elicit a distribution for the time cost and randomly draw a monetary
cost from this distribution for each seller in the third treatment. The monetary
investment cost is private information to the seller, and the buyer only knows
the procedure for determining it.
The distribution of time costs is elicited from the subjects in the control
treatment after they have completed the ultimatum game, using the Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, 1964).
That is, each subject is asked to state a reservation price for staying 20 min-
utes. Then a random number x is drawn. If the subject’s reservation price is
below x, the subject is paid x and must stay. Otherwise, the subject leaves.
We now describe the three treatments in more detail.
2.1 Treatment I: Costless investment (control)
In each of the two rooms subjects are given a number between 1 and N, where
Ni sthe number of students in the room. Subjects with identical numbers
form a pair. Matching is random, and anonymity is maintained throughout.
The subjects are given the instructions and are asked to read them. Subjects
are allowed to ask clarifying questions to the experimenter, but not publicly.
At the beginning of the instructions the subjects are told whether they are in
room A orr o o mB .
After the subjects have read the instructions the subject in room A (the
seller) decides whether he/she will carry out an investment or not, at a zero
investment cost. If the investment is carried out, a SEK 100 revenue is created
for the pair, and the seller proposes how to split it. If the subject in room
B (the buyer) accepts the proposal, both individuals are paid according to
the proposal. If the buyer rejects the proposal, both get nothing, except their
participation fees.
52.2 Treatment II: Time investment
Treatment II is identical to Treatment I with the exception that the invest-
ment for the seller now consists of staying for 20 minutes after the end of the
experiment. After the subjects have been paid, all buyers leave. The sellers
that decided not to invest also leave at this point, whereas the investors stay
for 20 minutes and are given a questionnaire to complete. After 20 minutes
the experimenter collect the questionnaires and the investors leave.
2.3 Treatment III: Money investment
Treatment III is identical to Treatment II with the exception that the invest-
ment is now monetary. All subjects are told that the investment cost varies
between the sellers and that the size of the investment cost is communicated
only to the respective seller. All subjects are also given the following infor-
mation about how the investment cost has been determined: “In a separate
group in the experiment 50 individuals have valued their cost of staying after
the end of the experiment for 20 minutes (and they were informed that they
would complete a questionnaire during these 20 minutes to pass the time). The
valuation was done in a way so that every person had an incentive to reveal
his/her true cost. For every person in room A we have randomly chosen the
cost of giving up 20 minutes for one of these 50 individuals and used this cost
as the investment cost.”
2.4 Eliciting time costs
The subjects that participated in Treatment I also valued the cost of stay-
ing for 20 minutes. Before the experiment started they were told that they
would participate in two experiments. When they had completed the ﬁrst
experiment, Treatment I, they were given the instructions for the second ex-
periment, valuing the cost of 20 minutes. We used this procedure because we
wanted the valuation of the time cost to resemble as closely as possible the
situation in the time investment group (Treatment II). In both groups the 20
minutes of ﬁlling in questionnaires occur after participating in an experiment
of about the same nature and duration.
The BDM mechanism, developed by Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964),
provides incentives for subjects to truthfully reveal the value they assign to a
private good, in this case 20 minutes of the subjects’ time. Each subject states
his/her minimum compensation (price) for staying 20 minutes after the end of
the experiment (and they are told that they will complete a questionnaire dur-
ing these 20 minutes to pass the time). We draw a buying price randomly from
a uniform distribution between SEK 0 and SEK 100 (with SEK 5 increments).
6If the buying price exceeds or equals the reservation price, the subject receives
the buying price and stay for 20 minutes. If the buying price is below the
reservation price the subject leaves. As in previous applications of the BDM
mechanism (e.g. Grether and Plott 1979; Bohm, Lind´ en, and Sonneg˚ ard 1997)
the subjects were informed about the incentive compatibility properties of the
BDM mechanism. As recommended by Bohm, Lind´ en, and Sonneg˚ ard (1997),
we did not communicate the upper bound of the buying price. Instead, we
told the subjects that the upper bound is set at a level corresponding to the
maximum reasonable valuation of the cost of giving up 20 minutes.6
2.5 Hypotheses and tests
Our null hypothesis is that bargaining behavior is the same in the three treat-
ments. Because bargaining experiments usually lead to skewed distributions,
we employ bootstrapped standard errors when comparing mean proposals
across treatments.7 The signiﬁcance levels for the comparisons of proposals
have all been obtained by generating 2,099 bootstrap replications. To compare
proportions (e.g., the proportion of investors and the proportion of accepted
proposals) between treatments, we use a contingency table Pearson chi-square
test (D’Agostino, Chase, and Belanger 1988). All reported p-values are two-
sided. Finally, we use logistic regression analysis to test whether the buyers’
acceptance probability diﬀers across treatments, controlling for the bargaining
proposal.
3 Results
Figure 1 displays the distribution of elicited time costs. The time cost varies
between SEK 0 and SEK 100 for the 56 subjects.8 The mean value is SEK
28 and the median value is SEK 25, which is also the most common time cost
–a b out 20% of the subjects had a time cost of SEK 25. The distribution of
time costs in Treatment III is virtually identical to that in Figure 1.9
6Incidentally, our upper bound turned out to coincide exactly with the highest reported
valuation.
7See e.g. Efron and Tibshirani (1993) and Davidson and MacKinnon (1999).
8All time costs except two were given in even SEK 5 increments. The two time costs
that were not in even SEK 5 increments (SEK 39 and SEK 49) are included in the closest
categories in Figure 1.
9All the estimated time costs in Figure 1 is used except one estimate, because the number
of estimates (n=56) is one more than the bargaining pairs (n=55). The (randomly chosen)
estimate that is not used is SEK 80.
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Table 1 reports the “average” behavior of sellers and buyers. Sellers in the
money investment group on average propose prices that are about SEK 5
higher than the proposals in the time investment group (p=0.056), and SEK
9 higher than the proposals in the control group (p=0.001). Although the
average proposal is somewhat higher in the time investment group than in the
control group, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence (p =0 .213).
There is also a tendency that fewer sellers are willing to make monetary invest-
Treatment p–value of diﬀerence
Control Time Money 1 vs 2 1 vs 3 2 vs 3
Number of pairs 28 55 55
Proportion investors 1.00 0.98 0.93 0.473 0.144 0.170
Average proposal 59.43 63.24 68.34 0.213 0.001 0.056
Share of proposals ≤ 50 0.32 0.30 0.06 0.815 0.002 0.002
Share of proposals ≥ 80 0.07 0.28 0.18 0.029 0.197 0.217
Acceptance rate 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.957 0.898 0.827
Table 1: Aggregate results
ments. In the time investment group only one seller abstained from making the
investment, whereas four sellers abstained from making the investment in the
8money investment group. Again the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant
(p =0 .170). As might be expected, the four sellers that abstain from investing
have relatively high investment costs (SEK 100, SEK 70, SEK 50 and SEK 25).
This is consistent with Ellingsen and Johannesson (2005a), who showed that
asymmetric information about investment costs reduces investment compared
to various complete information benchmarks.
There is a tendency for sellers with higher investment costs to demand a
larger share of the SEK 100. An increase in the investment cost by SEK 1 in
the money investment group on average increases the proposal by SEK 0.16
(p =0 .096).10
Figure 2 displays the full distribution of proposals by sellers in the control
group (the ultimatum game).11 The most common proposals are SEK 50 and
SEK 60, which is well in line with other studies; see Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
and Camerer (2003, Chapter 2).
Figure 3 compares the distribution of proposals between the money and
time investment groups.12 Comparing behavior in the time treatment to that
in the money treatment using a Two-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we
ﬁnd that the two distributions are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (p =0 .038). The
most striking diﬀerence is the proportion of 50/50 proposals. The proportion
of equal splits of the gross surplus is 30% in the time investment group, but
only 6% in the money investment group. This diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant
(p =0 .002). Interestingly, two subjects in the time investment group propose
SEK 0, i.e. they give away all the gains from trade. At the same time, there
appears to be a countervailing tendency towards high proposals in the time
investment group. The fraction of proposals at SEK 80 or above is 28% in
the time investment group and 18% in the money investment group, but the
diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant (p =0 .217).
We may also compare the distribution of proposals between the time in-
vestment group and the control group. The fraction of proposals of SEK 50
is almost identical in these two groups (about 30% in each group). However,
the fraction of high proposals is higher in the time investment group. The
10In Ellingsen and Johannesson (2005a) 75% of sellers had zero investment cost and 25%
had an investment cost of SEK 60. Despite this diﬀerence in the investment cost distribution,
the relationship between the size of the investment cost and the bargaining proposal is quite
similar across the two studies. There, an increase in the investment cost by SEK 1 in the
money investment group on average increased the proposal by SEK 0.12.
11One seller made a proposal of SEK 49, and for convenience this proposal is included in
the SEK 50 category in Figure 2.
12One seller in the monetary cost group made a proposal of SEK 63.5 and one seller made
a proposal of SEK 79. In Figure 3, these proposals are included in the SEK 65 and SEK 80
categories respectively.
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fraction of proposals at or above SEK 80 is 28% in the time investment group
versus 7% in the control group (p =0 .029). It seems as if the sellers in the
time investment group can roughly be divided into two categories. One cate-
gory ignores the time cost when they make the bargaining proposal; the other
category acts as if investment is monetary. The group that ignores the time
cost is the same size as the group that propose an even split in the standard
ultimatum game. It seems reasonable to guess that people who are fairminded
in the ultimatum game are also generous with their time, but the only way to
determine the overlap between the two groups is to have subjects participate
in multiple treatments.
3.2 Buyer behavior
The buyers’ average acceptance rate is about 90% in all three treatments (see
Table 1). In Table 2 we report the results of a logistic regression testing
whether the acceptance probability diﬀers across treatments when we control
for the proposal.
As expected, the acceptance probability decreases for higher proposals, and
this eﬀect is strongly signiﬁcant (p<0.001). The acceptance probability at
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as p eciﬁc proposal is also signiﬁcantly higher in the time investment group
(p =0 .068) and the money investment group (p =0 .095) compared to the
control group. The diﬀerence between the time investment group and the
money investment group is small and not statistically signiﬁcant (p =0 .710).
We thus ﬁnd no evidence that buyer behavior diﬀers between the money and
time investment treatments.13
4 Discussion
The most interesting observation from our experiment is that a sizeable frac-
tion of sellers require no compensation for their time investment, whereas al-
most all sellers require compensation for monetary investment. Our preferred
explanation is that subjects are generally more prone to make non–monetary
sacriﬁces than to make equivalent monetary sacriﬁces. Indeed, any alterna-
tive explanation would seem to involve some bias in our time cost elicitation
procedure.
An interesting avenue for further research is to identify the source of the
money–time asymmetry that we have identiﬁed. In a survey of donor attitudes
Lee, Piliavin, and Call (1999) ﬁnd that volunteering of time is more strongly
13As we only observe an accept/reject decision of each buyer, the statistical power to
detect diﬀerences in buyer behavior is also limited.
11Variable Coeﬃcient p–value
Constant 19.695 < 0.001
Proposal -0.260 < 0.001
Time investment* 2.040 0.068
Symm. info; high cost* 1.752 0.095
Number of pairs 133
χ2 34.72
Log–likelihood -27.39
McFadden pseudo R2 0.39
Individual prediction (%) 91.73
*Baseline category is costless investment (control).
Table 2: Logistic regression of acceptance probability.
aﬀected by others’ expectations than are gifts of blood and money. The authors
speculate that the greater visibility of time donations make people behave more
prosocially on this domain. Another hypothesis is that generous donors who
care about social esteem can signal their type at lower cost in the time domain,
because this form of generosity is harder for more selﬁsh donors to mimic; see
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004b).
At a broader level, our study contributes to the literature on framing eﬀects.
It is by now well known that pure labelling can have a massive impact on
behavior. For example, behavior in Prisoners’ dilemma experiments is highly
sensitive to whether the game is called the Wall Street game or the Community
game; see for example Liberman, Samuels and Ross (2004) and the references
therein. Our experiments suggest that people would be more generous if asked
to “give time” than if asked to “give money”.14
5 Conclusion
Human capital theory, as developed by Becker (1964,1965) and others, has
been tremendously successful at explaining many features of social interac-
tion. However, by focussing on the exchange of labor services for money, and
14As far as we know, there is no established theory of framing eﬀects. However, Ellingsen
and Johannesson (2006) may have the seed of such a theory. They propose a model in
which people with multi-dimensional characteristics care about social esteem, and where
the context may determine which characteristic is salient.
12assuming perfect convertibility between the two, human capital theory takes
for granted Benjamin Franklin’s dictum that “time is money.” By contrast,
anthropologists have long insisted that the convertibility between time and
money is heavily circumscribed. Many societies place extremely strict restric-
tions on exchange, several of the most striking examples being recounted by
Bohannan (1963, Part 4). However, since many of the anthropologists’ fa-
vorite examples are “exotic,” their impact on mainstream economics has been
modest.
Our experiment oﬀers a clean piece of evidence that many Swedish business
students do not treat their time in the same way as they treat their money.
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